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Trade Union Membership and Works Councils
in West Germany**
Abstract – The fraction of works councillors belonging to a trade union in Germany is much 
higher than union density among employees. If works councils represent the face of unions, 
union membership of employees should be related positively to the existence of works coun-
cils and their proximity to unions. Using data from the German Socio-Economic-Panel SOEP 
for West Germany we find that (a) works councillors exhibit a higher probability of being a 
union member, (b) the mere existence of a works council within an establishment has no sig-
nificant impact on union membership and (c) a ten percent decrease in the average share of 
unionised works councillors coincides with a ten percent fall in the probability of being a union 
member. Hence, the decline in the unionisation of works councillors and the fall in union 
density in West Germany are closely linked. 
Mitgliedschaft in Gewerkschaften und Betriebsräte in Westdeutschland 
Zusammenfassung – Der Anteil der Gewerkschaftsmitglieder an allen Mitgliedern eines 
Betriebsrates ist erheblich höher als der gewerkschaftliche Organisationsgrad der Arbeitneh-
mer. Stellen Betriebsräte das Aushängeschild der Gewerkschaften dar, sollte die Gewerk-
schaftsmitgliedschaft der Beschäftigten positiv mit der Existenz von Betriebsräten und deren 
Nähe zu Gewerkschaften korreliert sein. Auf der Basis von Daten des Sozioökonomischen 
Panels (SOEP) für Westdeutschland finden wir zu dieser Hypothese folgende Ergebnisse: (a) 
Betriebsräte haben eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit Gewerkschaftsmitglieder zu sein. (b) Die 
alleinige Existenz eines Betriebsrates innerhalb eines Betriebs hat keine signifikante Auswir-
kung auf die Mitgliedschaft. (c) Eine zehnprozentige Abnahme des durchschnittlichen Organi-
sationsgrades von Betriebsräten in einer Branche geht einher mit einer zehnprozentigen Redu-
zierung der Wahrscheinlichkeit, Gewerkschaftsmitglied zu sein. Folglich sind die Abnahme des 
Organisationsgrads in Westdeutschland und der fallende Anteil gewerkschaftlich organisierter 
Betriebsräte eng miteinander verknüpfte Phänomene. 
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1.  Introduction 
Why has trade union membership declined so dramatically in Germany since unifica-
tion, dropping from approximately 13.7 million in 1990 to 8.5 million members in 
2005? Age, sex, or occupational characteristics have consistently been found to ex-
plain an individual’s probability of being a trade union member. However, these de-
terminants of membership have not changed sufficiently over time to explain the dra-
matic decline in union density (Fitzenberger et al. 2006; Schnabel/Wagner 2006a). 
Among the explanatory variables subjected to empirical scrutiny, a particularly rele-
vant one especially in the German industrial relations context has often been missing, 
namely the impact of employee representation at the establishment level. 
While the influence of trade unions within establishments is often limited in 
Germany, there is a well-established system of employee representation at the level of 
the establishment, involving extensive information, consultation and co-determination 
rights. The Works Constitution Act makes works councils mandatory in all firms with 
at least five full-time employees. They are elected by the entire workforce. Since elec-
tions do not have to take place, unless employees request them, works council are not 
comprehensive. In the year 2000, works councils existed in one out of six establish-
ments and covered about 53 % of all German employees (Addison et al. 2004). Works 
councils are legally independent from trade unions and there is a fairly strict division 
of competences. Nevertheless, they are often closely related to trade unions since a 
large but declining majority of works councillors belong to trade unions. This suggests 
that the presence of works councils within an establishment can influence the decision 
of employees to become or be a member of a trade union. The conjecture is sup-
ported by the evidence on the development of union density and works council cov-
erage over time, as the share of employees who are represented by works councils has 
also fallen.1
Our hypothesis is that the existence of unionised works councils has a positive 
impact on the probability of an individual being a member of a trade union. We inves-
tigate this hypothesis using a representative survey of German residents (SOEP) 
which, inter alia, provides information on union density and representation by works 
councils for the years 2001 and 2003. We find that the fraction of unionised employ-
ees has declined by 1.7 percentage points from 2001 to 2003 to a level of 19.5 %. The 
share of works councillors who are members of a trade union has fallen more rapidly 
during that time span from about 68 % to 56 %. Our econometric analysis reveals that 
the proximity of works councils to trade unions, as measured by the fraction of union-
ised works councillors in an industry, is an important determinant of the individual 
membership decision. This implies that the strength of trade unions in Germany can 
be influenced by the share of unionised works councillors. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 substantiates our claim that the exis-
tence of works councils and, in particular, their proximity to trade unions can have an 
impact on the probability of an employee belonging to a union. To do so, the relation-
                                                          
1  Hassel (1999b) reports – for a non-representative sample – that the coverage of private 
sector employees by works councils declined from 50 % to 40 % from 1981 to 1994.
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ship between trade unions and works councils, primarily as regulated in the Works 
Constitution Act, is outlined first. Section 2.2 presents and discusses various argu-
ments as to why works councils can influence the probability of trade union member-
ship. The scarce and mostly indirect empirical evidence on this issue is summarised in 
Section 2.3. The focus of our exposition of the legal situation is on the private sector. 
This is because there is a different, albeit similar system of employee representation in 
the public sector. Hence, most arguments with respect to the impact of works coun-
cils on union membership in the private sector discussed in Section 2.2 also apply to 
the public sector. We accommodate this similarity by including public sector employ-
ees into our empirical analysis. In Section 3 the data and the empirical specifications 
are described. Section 4 contains descriptive evidence on the unionisation of employ-
ees and works councils in Germany. This section also presents the estimates of a sin-
gle-equation model of trade union membership in which the information on the 
works councillor status of an individual and on the fraction of unionised works coun-
cillors in an industry enters as an exogenous explanatory variable. However, being a 
works councillor may be regarded as endogenous with respect to the individual deci-
sion to join a union, since unobservable individual abilities could influence both out-
comes for example. As a check of robustness, the results from estimating a recursive 
simultaneous two-equation probit model of union membership and works councillor-
ship are reported. They confirm the findings for the single-equation set-up. Section 5 
summarises our results and concludes. 
2.  On the relationship between works councils and trade unions 
2.1  Works councils and trade unions in the German system of  
industrial relations 
An extensive coverage by works councils in Germany dates back to 1920 when this 
institution was established by law.2 At that time works councils were introduced as a 
means to mitigate revolutionary desires. They were interpreted as an instrument of 
more reform-oriented unions, in order to further their influence at the plant level. 
Subsequent to World War II the dual interest representation through unions on the 
one hand and by works councils on the other hand was set up again, after being de-
stroyed during the Third Reich. In particular, the Works Constitution Act (WCA, 
‘Betriebsverfassungsgesetz’) of 1952 gave works councils (‘Betriebsräte’) important 
powers in social, personnel, and economic matters. Trade unions did not unanimously 
approve of this law. Firstly, some regional regulations which were replaced by the 
Works Constitution Act had involved substantially more co-determination rights than 
the WCA. Secondly, the Works Constitution Act emphasised the independence of 
works councils from unions at the establishment level. In 1972, the Works Constitu-
tion Act was amended and co-determination rights of works councils in social and 
personnel matters were extended. But, as Müller-Jentsch (1995: 55) points out, “al-
though the access of the unions to the workplace and their links with the works coun-
                                                          
2  See Müller-Jentsch (1995), Addison (1999), and Addison et al. (2000) for descriptions of 
the development of co-determination in Germany and the current regulations of the 
Works Constitution Act in English. 
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cils were improved, the formal independence of the councils and their exclusive juris-
diction over interest representation at the plant level were not affected.” 
According to today’s version of the Works Constitution Act, which was last 
changed substantially in 2001, a works council must be established in any private sec-
tor company with at least five full-time employees at their request. Works councils are 
elected by all employees of full age in an establishment, with the exception of so-called 
‘Leitende Angestellte’, employees with substantial decision-making rights (§ 5 WCA). 
Works councils have co-determination rights on social issues and personnel matters 
and can veto hiring and dismissal decisions under fairly restrictive conditions. They 
also have information and consultation rights regarding matters of personnel planning 
and the organisation of the work process and information entitlements with respect to 
business matters. Some of these competences are limited to larger companies, with 
more than 20 or 100 full-time employees. The works council must act “in the spirit of 
mutual trust, taking into account effective collective bargaining agreements, and in 
collaboration with trade unions and employers associations present in the establish-
ment, with the aim of furthering the well-being of employees and establishment” (own 
translation, WCA § 2). To achieve this objective, union representatives must be 
granted access to the establishment. Unions can, in addition, propose candidates for 
works council elections (§ 14) and bring cases to the labour court if employers do not 
adhere to their obligations detailed in the Works Constitution Act (§ 23). A union 
representative can participate in works council meetings if at least 25 % of the works 
councillors make an according request (§ 31). Moreover, employers and works coun-
cillors are obliged to prevent any discrimination, inter alia, with respect to union activ-
ity and attitudes towards trade unions (§ 75). While works council members are not 
allowed to call a strike in their role as councillors, they are not restricted in their union 
activities (§ 74).
This brief survey of the role of unions as laid down in the Works Constitution 
Act indicates that trade unions and their representatives can play an important role for 
works council activities. However, their impact on a firm’s decision is often contin-
gent on cooperation of the works council. In this sense, works councils may be inter-
preted as gatekeepers who can regulate a trade union’s influence at the establishment 
level.
2.2  Works councils and trade union membership –  
some theoretical considerations 
Joining a trade union can be interpreted as the decision to purchase a good. While the 
price of the good can be measured precisely – the union membership fee – the nature 
of the good which an employee acquires by joining a union is less well defined. Many 
of the benefits which trade unions confer on their members are not private but consti-
tute semi-public or pure public goods. This is especially true in Germany where the 
Basic Law (‘Grundgesetz’) guarantees the right to form coalitions between employees 
and employers. This basic right also entails the right not to join a coalition, such as a 
trade union. Accordingly, closed shops are illegal. This ‘negative freedom to join a 
coalition’ has also been interpreted by legal experts as ruling out differential wages or 
working conditions for otherwise alike union members and non-members. Accord-
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ingly wages, working conditions, employment protection rules, and further conse-
quences of trade unions activities benefit all employees within a firm or industry to 
which a collective bargaining agreement applies, irrespective of whether the person is 
a member of a trade union or not. This implies strong incentives to take a free ride on 
the benefits of trade union membership. 
The last decades in the economic analysis of union membership have been char-
acterised by the search for (quasi-) private goods which are uniquely related to trade 
union membership.3 Trade unions have been hypothesised to further employment 
protection solely for its members (Moreton 1998; Moreton 1999; Jones/McKenna 
1994) and to be the sole provider of unemployment insurance (Holmlund/Lundborg 
1999). Booth/Chatterji (1995: 346) further suggest “legal and pensions advice” and 
“grievance and promotion procedures” as private goods provided by unions. In addi-
tion to interpreting the excludable good in the above terms, trade union membership 
has also been viewed as providing a reputation which enhances a member’s utility 
directly due to an according societal norm.4 Since this reputation effect can only be 
obtained by a union member, social custom models can also help to overcome the 
free-rider problem. 
Works councils have not played a role in this literature yet. This is to some extent 
surprising. We have identified five reasons for this neglect: Firstly, there is a close 
relationship between works councils and trade unions in Germany, as outlined above 
in Section 2.1. In addition, a large majority of works councillors have been or are trade 
union members (see Section 2.3 below for evidence). Therefore, industrial relations 
scholars have repeatedly interpreted works councils as decisive instruments of trade 
unions to recruit members within firms (Kotthoff 1979: 299; Streeck 1981: 209 ff.; 
Müller-Jentsch 1995: 61; Ebbinghaus/Visser 1999; Heery 2003). Taking this hypothe-
sis as a starting point, Behrens (2005) estimates the probability that a works council 
will invest great effort in recruiting new union members. He finds a significantly posi-
tive impact of the union density of work councillors on this probability. 
Secondly, works councillors can influence hiring and dismissal decisions (accord-
ing to §§ 99 – 103 WCA), as mentioned above. Given a proximity of works council-
lors to trade unions, their impact on employment decisions implies that works coun-
cillors may relate trade union membership of an individual to his or her future job 
prospects (Streeck 1981: 211; Hassel 1999a: 142 ff.). An according relation can exist, 
even if the Works Constitutions Act explicitly forbids discriminating non-members 
since such membership-based discrimination is difficult to substantiate. Thirdly, un-
ionised works councils can enforce a norm or custom according to which free-riding 
on union membership is not desirable (Checchi/Visser 2005). This would suggest that 
the proximity of works councillors to trade unions, as manifested in their union mem-
bership, is conducive to an individual’s probability of membership. Fourthly, trade 
                                                          
3  See Schnabel (2003) for a survey of the literature. 
4  Such models of trade union membership are based on the seminal paper by Akerlof 
(1980) and have been developed and employed by Booth/Chatterji (1993); Corneo (1993, 
1995, 1997); Naylor/Cripps (1993); Naylor/Raaum (1993); Goerke (1997); and Goerke/ 
Pannenberg (2004), inter alia. 
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union membership may be viewed as an experience good (Bryson/Gomez 2003: 74). 
The stronger the linkage between works councils and trade unions is, the more employ-
ees experience the effects of trade unions and the more likely it is that they also join. 
Finally, union membership has been shown to increase with the existence of insti-
tutions which are closely related to trade unions, such as union unemployment insur-
ance schemes. The so-called Ghent systems usually do not make trade union member-
ship compulsory in order to obtain unemployment benefits. However, since the col-
lection of unemployment insurance contributions and the paying out of benefits is 
organised by trade unions or by affiliated funds, the contact between employees and 
trade unions is much more intensive in countries with a Ghent system. This can en-
hance the incentives to join a union, or to remain a union member when becoming 
unemployed. The evidence for such a linkage comes primarily from cross-country 
studies on union density (Western 1993; Western 1997: 55, 133; Ebbinghaus/Visser 
1999; Blaschke 2000; Checchi/Visser 2005). Böckerman/Uusitalo (2006) show in 
addition that the emergence of independent, non-union related-unemployment insur-
ance funds reduces union density in Finland.
The argument that being exposed to institutions close to trade unions enhances the 
probability of union membership can be extended to (unionised) works councils. In 
addition, such an institutional explanation of union membership decisions is amenable 
to an empirical investigation at the level of the individual employee because the experi-
ence of employees with the institution ‘works council’ varies greatly in Germany. This is 
the case because works council exist only in about every sixth company. Note though 
that works councils exist in an overwhelming majority of large firms. Therefore, the 
fraction of employees working in establishments in which there are works councils is 
much higher than 16% and amounts to around 61 % in our data for 2001.5
All of the above arguments referring to the positive impact of works councils on 
trade union membership are based on the assumption that works councillors are trade 
union members. If, however, that is not the case, works councillors will – presumably 
– not have an incentive to recruit employees as members or to enforce a social custom 
of trade union membership. Works councils which are dominated by non-union 
members may instead suggest to employees that non-membership is advantageous 
(Ebbinghau/Visser 1999; Schnabel/Wagner 2006b). Furthermore, works councillors 
who abstain from unions are less likely to relate union membership with job pros-
pects. A non-unionist works council may also function as a substitute for union activi-
ties at the establishment level and, hence, for union membership (Blaschke 2000; Vis-
ser 2002). Accordingly, a positive relationship between the incentives of being a trade 
union member and the existence and activities of works councils may be contingent 
on the proximity of works councils to trade unions.
2.3  Evidence on works councils and union membership 
The unionisation of works councillors, or more precisely the number of works coun-
cillors who are members of a trade union relative to all works councillors, can be used 
                                                          
5  See Table A.2 in the Appendix. Addison et al. (2004) calculate a works council coverage 
of 54 % in West Germany for 2000, using the IAB Establishment Panel. 
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to measure the proximity between works councillors and trade unions. At an aggregate 
level, such information has been collected by the German Trade Union Confederation 
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) for firms in which at least one works council-
lor is a member of a trade union belonging to the DGB (Hassel 1999a: 143). In addi-
tion, the Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, a research institute associated with the 
German employers’ associations, provides data on the union membership of works 
councillors for a sample of firms which belong to employer associations. The latter 
data, spanning a longer time period, is summarised in Figure 1. 
Figure 1:  Union density of works councillors and heads of works councils 1965-2002 
(Sources: Niedenhoff 1981, 2003).
50
60
70
80
90
100
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Figure 1 depicts the share of works councillors (bold line) and the heads of works 
councils (dotted line) belonging to a trade union. Works council elections have gener-
ally taken place every three years until 1990. Works councillors have been elected for a 
period of four years since then. Hence, the last election included in Figure 1 took 
place in 2002. The numbers summarised in Figure 1 indicate that the trade union den-
sity of works councillors has declined substantially from 90 % in 1965 to about 75 % 
in 1994 and to less than 60 % in 2002. The change in the fraction of union members 
among the heads of works councils has been comparable, although their density level 
has been considerably higher.
The data from the German Trade Union Confederation show that the share of 
works councillors who are union members declined only marginally to slightly less 
than 80 % in the period 1972 to 1994 (Hassel 1999a; Hassel 1999b). Until 1998, the 
next year in which works councils were elected, the respective share fell to about 73 % 
(Behrens 2005). The differential results suggest that the union density of works coun-
cillors shrank (from 1972 – 1994) especially because the share of completely non-
unionised works councils rose, which are not included into the data from the DGB. 
Irrespective of the source of information, trade union density among works council-
lors is found to be least in those industries in which the fraction of unionised employ-
ees is also relatively low (Niedenhoff 2003; Hassel 1999b).
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Trade union density in Germany was relatively stable from the mid 60s to mid 
70s and increased slightly during the second half of the 70s, only to fall again during 
the 1980s. Density jumped by about five percentage points with German unification 
and has declined dramatically since then to – depending on the exact measure of un-
ion density looked at – approximately two-thirds or less of the level prevailing in the 
1960s. This development is comparable to the change in the union density of works 
councillors as summarised in Figure 1, suggesting that the two types of density may be 
related. However, while the relative reduction in union densities among employees 
and works councillors from the mid 1960s to the beginning of this decade has been 
similar in magnitude, the development for the union density of works councillors has 
been less erratic. 
Despite the various indications that the existence of works councils and the frac-
tion of unionised works councillors may have a positive impact on the probability of 
an employee being a trade union member, immediate empirical evidence on this rela-
tionship is scarce. Schnabel/Wagner (2007) find that trade union presence at the 
workplace raises the probability of union membership in all 18 countries which are 
included into the analysis. This finding is consistent with evidence by Ebbinghaus/ 
Visser (1999); Checchi/Visser (2005); Checchi/Lucifora (2002); and Visser (2002) for 
union density in Western European countries. Schnabel/Wagner (2006b) confirm the 
impact of union representation on membership for Germany. Estimating the prob-
ability of never being a union member, they obtain a significantly negative impact of 
union representation at the workplace.
All of the above mentioned studies do not measure the impact of works councils 
on trade union membership directly. There are only two studies – to our knowledge – 
which can provide evidence on this issue. Blaschke (2000) finds that the existence of 
statutory works councils in a country either has no impact on union density or actually 
reduces it in a sample of Western European nations. Thus, Blaschke’s (2000) findings 
relate to legal conditions, rather than the actual situation. Estimating the probability of 
union membership, using individual data from 1976 to 1984 for Germany, Win-
dolf/Haas (1989: 150) find that “the number of works councillors who are union 
members (average for the given industry)” has a positive effect on the probability of 
membership. They view their finding to be an indication of the recruiting effort of 
work councillors.6
Summing up, there are numerous theoretical arguments suggesting that the un-
ionisation of works councils may positively influence an employee’s decision whether 
to become a union member. While there are empirical indications that such a relation-
ship exists, they are at best indirect, and an explicit test using recent representative 
data is lacking.
                                                          
6  Windolf/Haas (1989: 155) furthermore interpret their results as showing "that union 
membership of works councillors has a positive effect on the union density of the firm.
Simply speaking, if all works councillors in that firm are union members, the union density 
of the workforce in that firm is likely to be high (italics added)." Bearing in mind that they 
have no information on the existence of a works council in the particular firm, this 
interpretation seems to be rather bold. 
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3.  Data and empirical specifications  
3.1  Data 
Our data stems from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a nationally repre-
sentative longitudinal survey of the resident German population (Wagner et al. 1993; 
SOEP Group 2001).7 We use survey data for the years 2001 and 2003, because the 
survey includes information on union membership and on works councillorship in 
both years. Our sample consists of West German full- and part-time employees in the 
private and public sector with valid information on union membership and works 
councillorship. Observations from self-employed persons and apprentices are ex-
cluded.8 We restrict ourselves to West German employees as there are too few obser-
vations for East Germany to calculate industry-specific shares of unionised works 
councillors in all cases. Sample weights are used in the descriptive as well as in the 
econometric analysis to take into account the sampling design of the different sub-
samples of the SOEP as well as panel attrition (Pannenberg et al. 2004).
Information on individual union membership and works councillorship is gener-
ated from a survey question whether the respondent is a member of a trade union 
and/or a works council respectively. In the survey year 2001, but not in 2003, addi-
tional information is available on the existence of a works council in the establishment 
of the respondent which we use to generate a corresponding dummy variable indicat-
ing the incidence of works councils (WCINC). A further key variable in our empirical 
analysis is the net union density of works councils. Since we do not have information 
on union membership of works councillors in a respondent’s establishment, we utilise 
data on unionised works councils at the industry level. We calculate industry-specific 
net union densities of works councils (WCUD) as the share of unionised councillors 
among all works councillors in the particular industry. The industry dummies mimic 
the union structure in Germany, i.e. manufacturing, chemicals/mining/energy, con-
struction, transport, food/sundries/restaurants, education and science, and other pub-
lic sector occupations (see Table A1 in the Appendix for documentation) and are 
generated from NACE 1-digit levels.9
                                                          
7  The data used in this paper was extracted using the Add-On package SOEP Menu written 
by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (Haisken-DeNew 2005; http://www.soepmenu.de). J. 
Haisken DeNew and M. Hahn supplied SOEP Menu Plugins. Haisken-DeNew (2005) 
describes SOEP Menu in detail. 
8  Since we cannot identify employees with substantial decision rights (‘Leitende An-
gestellte’) in the data set precisely, we include them into our estimates. However, exclud-
ing the highest occupational category from the estimations, which implies excluding more 
than only ‘Leitende Angestellte’, does not change our subsequent findings. The results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
9  Note that there is a residual category for WCUD, resulting from cases in which informa-
tion on industry status is missing. Industry-dummies are generated by SOEP-Menu-
Plugin p2278 (author: J. Haisken-DeNew).
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3.2  Empirical specification 
Since we are interested in assessing the effects of works councils on trade union 
membership, we specify the following standard probit model: 
'
, , ,( 1| ) ( )? ? ?i t i t i tP U X X? ,  (1) 
where ,i tU =1 if the individual is a union member, ,i tX  is the vector of covariates, 
'? is a vector of unknown parameters and ()?  is the cdf of the standard normal 
distribution.
One might argue that being a works councillor, i.e. the result of running for a 
works council and being elected, is endogenous with respect to the individual decision 
to join a union since, for example, unobservable individual abilities and/or prefer-
ences have an impact on both outcomes. In this case, the estimated parameters of the 
single-equation probit model are biased. As a check of robustness, we additionally 
employ a recursive simultaneous two-equation probit model, which allows us to con-
trol for unobserved individual heterogeneity. Our specification builds on a reduced 
form latent variable specification of works councillorship ( *itWC ) and a structural 
form latent variable specification of union membership ( *itU ), where observed works 
councillorship (
it
WC ) enters the right-hand side:
* '
1 1, 1,
* '
2 2, 2,
it it it
it it it it
WC X
U WC X
? ?
? ? ?
? ?
? ? ?
 (2). 
The works councillorship variable itWC will equal 1 if 
* 0?itWC . The union mem-
bership variable i,tU  will equal 1 if 
* 0?itU , while 1,itX , 2,itX  are vectors of covari-
ates and ? , '1? ,
'
2?  are (vectors) of unknown parameters. The error terms 1,it? , 2,it?
are assumed to be independently and identically distributed as bivariate normal: 
1,
2,
0 1
~ ,
0 1
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?
it
it
IIDN
? ?
? ?
 (3), 
where ?  is the correlation coefficient which can be interpreted as the correlation 
between unobservable explanatory variables of the two equations, such as unobserved 
individual abilities. Note that the identification of parameters in this specification 
hinges on the functional form chosen, since we have no variable at hand that influ-
ences the probability of being a works councillor but has no direct impact on the like-
lihood of being a union member.10 The parameters are estimated using maximum 
                                                          
10  In preliminary regressions we started with a full simultaneous two equation model, in which 
observed union status also has an impact on the likelihood of being a works councillor. 
Without sufficient exclusion restrictions we could not identify the parameters of interest.
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likelihood as the estimation criterion (Greene 1998, 2003). A Wald-Test of ?  is used 
to test for endogeneity.11
We use two empirical specifications of models (1) and (2). Specification 1 makes 
use of SOEP-data for 2001 only, as information on the incidence of a works council 
in the establishment where the respondent works (WCINC) is available for this wave. 
In this case, itX  and 2,itX  include our key variables itWC  (works councillorship of 
the respondent), WCINC (incidence of works council in establishment), WCUD (net 
union density of works councillors in industry) and an interaction of WCUD and 
WCINC. Specification 2 uses data for 2001 and 2003.12 In that case, itX  and 2,itX
include itWC , WCUD as well as an interaction of WCUD and a dummy variable for 
the year 2003 (year 2003). The vectors itX , 1,itX , 2,itX  additionally contain the fol-
lowing joint subset of variables which have been found to determine union status:13
age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared and dummy variables for being a foreigner, 
being male, different firm size categories, doing an apprenticeship, having a university 
degree, having preferences for the social democratic party (SPD) or the Christian par-
ties (CDU/CSU), whether the father was self-employed when the respondent was 15 
years old, being a blue collar worker, the industry (NACE 1-digit) in which the re-
spondent works and the state of residence (‘Bundesland’). Table A.2 in the Appendix 
presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the econometric analysis. For all 
specifications, estimated parameters, their robust “clustered” standard errors and mar-
ginal effects are reported. 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive evidence 
Table 1 presents the key findings of a descriptive analysis of union membership and 
works councillorship in West Germany.
The figures reveal that net union density, i.e. the share of employed union members 
among the number of all employees, in West Germany has still been declining since 
2000 with levels of 21.2 % in 2001 and 19.5 % in 2003. These numbers are in line with 
the result of a steadily waning net union density for the period 1985-2003 by Fitzen-
berger et al. (2006, Figure 2) and Schnabel/Wagner (2006a, Table 1). The net works 
                                                          
11  A likelihood-ratio-test comparing the likelihoods of the two independent single-equation 
probit models with the likelihood of the recursive simultaneous two-equation probit 
model yields identical results.
12  We decided to use a “pooled estimator” with robust clustered covariance matrix instead 
of random-effects estimators since the latter requires orthogonality of the unobserved in-
dividual effect and the vector of covariates which is most likely not the case in our 
specification.
13  See, for example, Windolf/Haas (1989), Wagner (1991), Lorenz/Wagner (1991), Fitzen-
berger et al. (1999), Goerke/Pannenberg (2004), Fitzenberger/Beck (2004), Schnabel/ 
Wagner (2005), Schnabel/Wagner (2006a), and Fitzenberger et al. (2006). 
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Table 1:  Union membership and works councillorship in West Germany 
Source: SOEP 2001, 2003. Survey weights used.   
/: less than 20 unionised works councillors in that particular group. 
councillor density, i.e. the ratio of the number of works councillors to the number of 
all employees, is constant over time with 4.3 % in 2001 and 4.5 % in 2003. Hence, the 
amendment of the Works Constitutions Act in 2001 which – among other alterations 
– increased the mandatory size of the works council, depending on firm size, had no 
obvious impact on the prevalence of works councillors in the short-term. 
Our key variable, the net union density of works councillors, has declined re-
markably between 2001 and 2003. In 2001, roughly seven out of ten works councillors 
were also union members, while in 2003 this applied only to eleven out of 20 works 
councillors. This indicates that the impact of unions on works councils is declining 
over time and mirrors the decline of the overall net union density. The information 
generated from the representative SOEP data for West Germany is consistent with 
the evidence provided by Niedenhoff (2003) on the basis of a non-representative 
sample for the whole of Germany. Niedenhoff (2003) also finds that the share of 
union members among works councillors has fallen substantially since the beginning 
of this decade (see also Figure 1). 
Considering differences between the private and public sector, the net union den-
sity is remarkably higher in the public than in the private sector, while the erosion of 
union membership over time is observed in both sectors. Moreover, works councillors 
are more prevalent in the public than in the private sector. However, the share of 
unionised works councillors is much lower in the public sector than in the private 
sector.14 Within the private sector, the share of unionised works councillors is the 
highest in manufacturing and chemicals/mining/energy (see Table A.1 in the Appen-
dix). The net union density of works councils has been decreasing by a striking 25 % 
                                                          
14  Keller/Schnell (2003) estimate the fraction of unionised works councillors in the public 
sector (‘Personalräte’) to be above 70 % in 2002. Since they base their calculation on a 
completely different data set than we use, the numbers are not directly comparable. 
 2001 2003 
 Net 
Union
Density 
Net Works 
Councillors
Density 
Net Union 
Density of 
Works 
Councils
Net
Union
Density 
Net Works 
Councillors
Density 
Net Union 
Density of 
Works 
Councils
All 21.2 4.3 68.7 19.5 4.5 55.6 
Public Sector 26.6 5.9 56.8 24.7 6.9 54.6 
Private Sector 19.3 3.8 75.5 17.5 3.6 56.3 
Firm Size       
X < 20 employees 10.2 1.3 / 10.2 2.5 / 
20 ? X < 200 empl. 17.0 5.1 53.7 16.2 5.2 49.9 
200?X < 2000 empl. 24.3 5.3 75.4 23.1 5.9 59.1 
X ? 2000 employees 35.1 5.8 76.8 30.4 4.7 63.7 
N. of observations 7623 6807 
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in the private sector between 2001 and 2003 while it has been relatively stable in the 
public sector. Hence, the erosion in the prevalence of unions in works councils is 
substantially more pronounced in the private than in the public sector. With respect to 
firm size, we observe that net union density as well as net works councillor density is 
increasing with firm size. Moreover, the decline in net union density is more distinct 
the larger the establishment is.
4.2  Estimation results 
Table 2 presents the results for the two single-equation probit specifications.15 Starting 
with specification 1 (columns 1 and 2) the parameter estimate for being a member of a 
works council is significantly positive. The estimated marginal effect indicates that 
being a works councillor increases the likelihood of being a union member by 32 per-
centage points. Hence, conditional on observable personal as well as firm characteris-
tics we find a strong correlation between getting involved with co-determination is-
sues as a works councillor and the probability of being a union member.
Trying to detect the effect of works council activities at the work place on union 
membership, we include the net union density of works councils (WCUD), the 
dummy variable for the incidence of a works council (WCINC) as well as an interac-
tion of both variables. The existence of a works council (WCINC) has no significant 
impact on the probability of being a union member. At first sight, this finding may be 
surprising. However, it is in line with the evidence provided by Blaschke (2000) who 
detects no (or a significantly negative) impact of the existence of statutory works 
councils in a country on aggregate union density. Moreover, the estimated parameter 
of the interaction term is significantly positive, i.e. we observe a significantly positive 
effect of the average industry-specific net union density of works councillors if a 
works council exists in the particular establishment. Combining the marginal effect of 
the interaction term with the average of WCUD (66.76 %) in 2001, our estimate indi-
cates that the likelihood of being a union member will increase by 20 percentage 
points if the works council in the firm exhibits the average share of unionised mem-
bers among all works councillors instead of only consisting of non-union councillors. 
Compared to the estimated parameter for being a works councillor himself, the esti-
mated effect is remarkably high. This indicates that unionised works councils, but not 
works councils as such, exert a substantial influence on an employee’s decision to join 
a union. Our finding is consistent with viewing unionised works councils as (1) a re-
cruitment agency of trade unions, (2) creating or emphasising a social custom of union 
membership, (3) being able to influence the personnel policy of companies, (4) 
providing employees with the experience of unionisation, and, finally, (5) being the 
institutional face of trade unions at the establishment level. It should be emphasised, 
though, that the positive interaction term of WCUD and WCINC does not allow the 
relative importance of the various channels of influence to be assessed. 
                                                          
15  Marginal effects are evaluated at the weighted sample means of all explanatory variables. 
Marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated as the discrete change of union member-
ship the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1.  
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Table 2:  Determinants of union membership in West Germany 
Specification 1 (2001) Specification 2 (2001/03) 
Parameter / 
Std.-Err.
Marginal
Effect
Parameter / 
Std.-Err.
Marginal
Effect
Member of works council (WC) 0.981** 0.324 1.051** 0.352 
(0.100) -- (0.090) -- 
Net union density of works councils (WCUD) -0.004 -0.001 0.006* 0.002 
(0.006) -- (0.003) -- 
Incidence works council in firm (WCINC) -0.122 -0.030 -- -- 
(0.371) -- -- -- 
Interaction of WCUD with WCINC 0.011* 0.003 -- -- 
(0.006) -- -- -- 
Interaction WCUD with dummy year 2003 -- -- -0.004+ -0.001 
-- -- (0.002) -- 
Dummy variable: year 2003 -- -- 0.258+ 0.062 
-- -- (0.152) -- 
Male 0.192** 0.045 0.173** 0.041 
(0.064) -- (0.057) -- 
Foreigner -0.139 -0.031 -0.022 -0.005 
(0.093) -- (0.080) -- 
Part-time employment -0.158+ -0.036 -0.115+ -0.027 
(0.083) -- (0.069) -- 
Age (in years) 0.066** 0.016 0.064** 0.015 
(0.020) -- (0.018) -- 
Age squared (in years) -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 
(0.000) -- (0.000) -- 
Tenure (in years) 0.033** 0.008 0.042** 0.010 
(0.009) -- (0.008) -- 
Tenure squared (in years) -0.000+ -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 
(0.000) -- (0.000) -- 
Apprenticeship 0.056 0.013 0.042 0.010 
(0.088) -- (0.078) -- 
University degree -0.232* -0.052 -0.240* -0.053 
(0.106) -- (0.093) -- 
Prefers Social Democrats (SPD) 0.374** 0.098 0.355** 0.093 
(0.062) -- (0.054) -- 
Prefers Christian Parties (CDU/CSU) -0.106 -0.024 -0.117* -0.027 
(0.071) -- (0.055) -- 
Blue collar worker  0.512** 0.133 0.466** 0.121 
(0.066) -- (0.053) -- 
Father was self-employed -0.157+ -0.035 -0.130+ -0.029 
(0.087) -- (0.077) -- 
Firm size: 20 ? X < 200 employees 0.081 0.020 0.326** 0.083 
(0.096) -- (0.072) -- 
Firm size: 200 ? X < 2000 employees 0.183+ 0.046 0.571** 0.156 
(0.107) -- (0.075) -- 
Firm size: X ? 2000 employees 0.427** 0.112 0.792** 0.223 
(0.105) -- (0.073) -- 
Constant -3.147** -- -3.716** -- 
(0.582) -- (0.453) -- 
Industry dummies (NACE 1- digit) yes yes 
State dummies yes yes 
Number of Observations 7046 13220 
Wald_X (degrees of freedom) 892.29 (42)** 956.06 (42)** 
Source:  GSOEP 2001, 2003. Sample weights are used. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance levels: ** (0.01), * (0.05), + (0.1).
Wald_X: Wald – Test with H0: no joint significance of all regressors 
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Considering the parameter estimate of the dummy variable indicating whether the 
father was self-employed when the respondent was 15 years of age, we find a signifi-
cantly negative impact on being a union member. Households in which the father was 
self-employed tend to oppose the union movement. We interpret the significantly 
negative effect of the ‘father was self-employed’ variable as evidence for social custom 
explanations of joining a union (see Goerke/Pannenberg 2004). With respect to indi-
vidual characteristics of employees we observe a significantly positive effect of age, 
tenure, firm size and of being a blue collar worker on the probability of being union-
ised. Employees who prefer the Social Democrats exhibit a higher likelihood of being 
a union member. Yet, an employee with a university degree has a significantly lower 
probability of joining the union. All these results are in line with other empirical stud-
ies on the determinants of union membership in Germany (e.g. Fitzenberger/Beck 
2004; Fitzenberger et al. 2006; Schnabel/Wagner 2006a; Goerke/Pannenberg 2004). 
Specification 2 uses both waves of the SOEP in which information on works 
councillorship is available (Table 2, columns 3 and 4). This allows us to test whether the 
impact of the net union density of works councils on union membership has changed 
over time. Note however that we cannot control for the existence of a works council 
within the establishment of the respondent (WCINC) in this specification, since the 
relevant information is only available in 2001.
Works councillors exhibit a significantly higher probability of being a union 
member than non-councillors. The marginal effect is similar in size when compared to 
the result of specification 1. Moreover, the estimated parameter of the industry-
specific average net union density of works councils is significantly positive. The esti-
mated marginal effect implies that an employee of an establishment in a fictitious 
industry with the average share of unionised works councillors in both years, i.e. 
62.1 % (see table A.2 in the Appendix), exhibits a twelve percentage points higher 
chance of being a union member relative to a setting in which no councillors are 
members of a trade union. This indicates that the net union density is ceteris paribus 
higher in those industries in which unions exert a more intensive influence within 
works councils. The finding is again in line with an explanation that works councils are 
acting as recruitment agencies for unions, enhance a social custom of union member-
ship, provide additional job security for union members or the experience good ‘un-
ionism’, and behave as union representatives at the establishment level.
The estimated parameters of the dummy variable year 2003 as well as the interac-
tion of WCUD and year 2003 are significant at the 10 % level. The sum of the product 
of the estimated marginal effect for WCUD times the average value of WCUD 
(62.1 %), the marginal effect of year 2003, and the marginal effect of the interaction 
term times the average value of WCUD in 2003, i.e. 57.2%, yields an overall marginal 
effect for WCUD of 12.8 %. This number basically equals the previous one of 12.4 % 
percentage points. Hence, we do not observe a decreasing impact of the net union 
density of works councils on the individual probability of being unionised in the 
course of time, conditional on observable attributes of the employees and their estab-
lishments.
With respect to most other explanatory variables of the probability of union 
membership, specification 2 yields similar results to the previous one. As an excep-
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tion, the estimated parameter for individual preferences for Christian parties 
(CDU/CSU) has now become significantly negative, which is consistent with the fact 
that a major fraction of the CDU/CSU traditionally tends to oppose the political ob-
jectives of the German union movement.
One might object to the above interpretation of the estimation results that indi-
vidual decisions to join a union as well as to run (successfully) for works council 
membership are determined jointly, e.g. unobservable individual characteristics and/or 
preferences have an impact on both decisions. If this is so, the estimated parameters 
of the single-equation probit models will be biased. As a check of robustness, we es-
timated both empirical specifications of the recursive simultaneous two-equation pro-
bit model sketched above (equation 2). Table 3 presents the estimated parameters, 
their robust standard errors and the respective marginal effects of the union member-
ship equation.16
Regarding the parameter estimates of the works council variables of specification 
1, it is evident that the impact of being a member of the firm’s works council exerts a 
significantly larger impact on the likelihood of being a union member when we model 
the joint probability of union membership and works councillorship. The marginal 
effect indicates that being a works councillor increases the probability of union mem-
bership by 72 percentage points. Moreover, the effect of the interaction of the exis-
tence of a works council in the particular firm (WCINC) and the industry-specific net 
union density of works councils (WCUD) is alleviated, while still being significantly 
positive. The marginal effect indicates that the probability of being unionised will 
increase by roughly 13 percentage points if the share of unionised members among all 
works councillors of the particular firm rises from zero to the average share. Hence, 
controlling for the simultaneity of being a union member and a member of the works 
council, we again find supportive evidence that works councils do indeed have a posi-
tive impact on an employee’s decision of being a union member. As regards the other 
parameter estimates, we obtain similar results to the single-equation probits. The esti-
mated correlation parameter is significantly negative. This indicates the necessity to 
estimate a simultaneous two-equation model though identification in our particular 
empirical specification hinges on the functional form chosen. 
The estimates of specification two of the recursive simultaneous two-equation 
probit model support the previous results. The estimated parameter for being a 
works councillor is significantly positive and indicates that the likelihood of being a 
union member will increase by 72 percentage points if the employee is a works council 
member. Moreover, the estimated marginal effect of the significantly positive point 
estimate of WCUD shows that an employee in a fictitious industry with the average 
net union density of works councils has a six percentage points higher probability of 
being unionised, compared to the non-union case. If we additionally take into account 
                                                          
16  The parameter estimates of the reduced form works councillorship equation are not of 
primary interest for our particular analysis. Results for specification 1, that is, for 2001, are 
found in the Appendix in Table A.3. Further results are available from the authors on re-
quest.
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Table 3:  Check of robustness: Simultaneous equation model of the determinants of 
union membership in West Germany 
Specification 1 (2001) Specification 2 (2001/03) 
 Parameter / 
Std.-Err.
Marginal
Effect
Parameter / 
Std.-Err.
Marginal
Effect
Member of works council (WC) 2.166** 0.721 2.148** 0.717 
 (0.259) -- (0.357) -- 
Net union density of works councils (WCUD) -0.004 -0.001 0.006* 0.001 
 (0.005) -- (0.003) -- 
Incidence works council in firm (WCINC) -0.076 -0.019 -- -- 
 (0.367) -- -- -- 
Interaction of WCUD with WCINC 0.010+ 0.002 -- -- 
 (0.005) -- -- -- 
Interaction WCUD with dummy year 2003 -- -- -0.004+ -0.001 
 -- -- (0.002) -- 
Dummy variable: year 2003 -- -- 0.248+ 0.061 
 -- --  -- 
Male 0.181** 0.044 0.165** 0.040 
 (0.063) -- (0.055) -- 
Foreigner -0.177* -0.040 -0.042 -0.010 
 (0.090) -- (0.076) -- 
Part-time employment -0.137 -0.032 -0.097 -0.023 
 (0.081) -- (0.068) -- 
Age (in years) 0.057** 0.014 0.058** 0.014 
 (0.019) -- (0.018) -- 
Age squared (in years) -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 
 (0.000) -- (0.000) -- 
Tenure (in years) 0.032** 0.008 0.040** 0.010 
 (0.009) -- (0.008) -- 
Tenure squared (in years) -0.001* -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 
 (0.000) -- (0.000) -- 
Apprenticeship 0.027 0.007 0.018 0.004 
 (0.086) -- (0.077) -- 
University degree -0.238* -0.054 -0.242** -0.055 
 (0.104) -- (0.092) -- 
Prefers Social Democrats (SPD) 0.352** 0.093 0.341** 0.091 
 (0.061) -- (0.053) -- 
Prefers Christian Parties (CDU/CSU) -0.090 -0.021 -0.111* -0.026 
 (0.070) -- (0.055) -- 
Blue collar worker  0.487** 0.129 0.451** 0.119 
 (0.065) -- (0.052) -- 
Father was self-employed -0.165* -0.038 -0.138+ -0.032 
 (0.083) -- (0.073) -- 
Firm size: 20 ? X < 200 employees 0.034 0.008 0.285** 0.074 
(0.094) -- (0.071) -- 
Firm size: 200 ? X < 2000 employees 0.133 0.034 0.527** 0.145 
(0.105) -- (0.074) -- 
Firm size: X ? 2000 employees 0.376** 0.100 0.749** 0.213 
 (0.104) -- (0.073) -- 
Constant -2.888** -- -3.484** -- 
 (0.570) -- (0.445) -- 
-0.701** -- -0.613* -- Correlation par. (0.5*ln[(1+ ? )/(1- ? )] (0.204) -- (0.243) -- 
Industry dummies (NACE 1- digit) yes yes
State dummies yes yes
Number of Observations 7046 13220 
Wald-Test_X (degrees of freedom) 1562.14 (80)** 1406.61 (80)** 
Wald-Test_ ?  (degrees of freedom) 11.77 (1)** 6.48 (1)* 
Source:  GSOEP 2001, 2003. Sample weights are used. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   
Significance levels: ** (0.01), * (0.05), + (0.1).   
Wald_Test_X: H0: no joint significance of all regressors. Wald-Test_ ? : H0: ? =0.  
Estimated parameters of the works council equation for 2001 are documented in Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
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the two estimated marginal effects of year 2003 and of the interaction of WCUD and 
year 2003, we again find the same result as if we just take into account the marginal 
effect of WCUD. The estimated correlation parameter is significantly negative and the 
respective Wald-Test (Wald-Test_ ? ) indicates that there is indeed a significant corre-
lation between unobserved factors in both equations. All the other parameter esti-
mates as well as the test statistic of the overall Wald-test (Wald-Test_X) are very simi-
lar to those of specification 1.
5.  Conclusions 
Union membership in Germany has declined remarkably since the 1990s. Contempo-
raneously, the share of works councillors who are union members has fallen. In 2003, 
only every fifth employee in (West) Germany still belonged to a trade union while less 
than six out of ten works councillors were trade union members. Our empirical find-
ings suggest that the decline in the unionisation of works councillors and the fall of 
the overall union density in West Germany are closely linked. In particular, our results 
indicate that it is not the mere existence of a works council in the firm, but the prox-
imity of works councils to trade unions, as measured by the fraction of works council-
lors in an industry who are trade union members themselves, that represents an im-
portant determinant of trade union membership by ordinary employees. To illustrate 
the magnitude of this impact, assume an average employee who is working in an 
establishment with a works council in a fictitious industry with an average share of 
unionised works councillors. Our findings imply that if the average share of unionised 
works councillors in this industry declines by ten %, the probability of this employee 
being a member of a trade union will also fall by ten %. Hence, our results provide 
one important explanation for the stylised fact that changes in the composition of the 
work force have only played a minor role for the fall in union density in Germany 
(Fitzenberger et al. 2006; Schnabel/Wagner 2006a).
Our results strongly rely on the (change in the) net union density of works coun-
cillors within an industry. Ideally, one would also like to know how much the 
probability of union membership of an employee will change by if the fraction of 
works councillors within the establishment varies in which the respective employee 
works. This information could help, for example, to evaluate the gains from 
organising campaigns by trade unions. Unfortunately, the Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) does not provide the relevant information. Moreover, our data does not allow 
us to determine whether the positive impact of unionised works councils on union 
membership is due to (1) their recruitment efforts, (2) them enforcing a norm or 
social custom more actively, (3) influencing personnel policy, (4) providing employees 
with the experience of unionism, or (5) being the institutional face of trade unions at 
the establishment level. Hence, future research on these topics is necessary.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Industry-specific net union density of works councils (WCUD)
WCUD
2001 2003 
Manufacturing 78.91 72.21 
Chemicals/ Mining/ Energy 73.14 79.36 
Construction 73.15 63.96 
Transport 89.76 73.32 
Food/ Sundries/ Restaurants 44.69 35.26 
Education and Science 49.69 57.75 
Other Public Sector 59.06 48.45 
Industry info missing 83.52 56.49 
N. of observations 7623 6807 
Source: SOEP 2001, 2003. Survey weights are used.  N=14430.  
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Union membership (U) 0.20 0.40 
Works councillorship (WC) 0.04 0.21 
Net union density of works councils (WCUD) 62.07 12.74   
Incidence works council in firm (WCINC) 1 0.61 0.49   
Interaction of WCUD with WCINC 1 41.39 34.16   
Interaction WCUD with dummy year 2003 28.18 29.70   
Male 0.55 0.50   
Foreigner 0.09 0.28   
Part-time employment 0.21 0.41   
Age (in years) 41.45 10.86   
Tenure (in years) 10.98 10.09   
Apprenticeship 0.63 0.48   
University degree 0.22 0.41   
Prefers Social Democrats (SPD) 0.22 0.41   
Prefers Christian Parties (CDU/CSU) 0.18 0.38   
Blue collar worker 0.31 0.46   
Father was self-employed 0.11 0.31   
Firm size: 20 ? X < 200 employees 0.29 0.45   
Firm size: 200 ? X < 2000 employees 0.24 0.43   
Firm size: X ? 2000 employees 0.26 0.44   
Agriculture/ hunting/ fishing 0.01 0.08   
Mining/ quarrying 0.005 0.07   
Manufacturing 0.27 0.44   
Electricity/ gas/ water supply 0.01 0.09   
Construction 0.05 0.23   
Wholesale and retail trade/ repair 0.13 0.34   
Hotels/ restaurants 0.02 0.14   
Transport, storage/ communication 0.06 0.23   
Financial intermediation 0.05 0.22   
Real estate/ renting/ business 0.08 0.27   
Public administration/ defence 0.10 0.30   
Education 0.07 0.26   
Health/ social work 0.11 0.32   
Other services/ Private households  0.04 0.20   
Berlin 0.04 0.19   
Schleswig-Holstein 0.05 0.21   
Hamburg 0.02 0.16   
Lower Saxony 0.12 0.32   
Bremen 0.01 0.10   
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.27 0.45   
Hessen 0.08 0.28   
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland 0.06 0.25   
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.16 0.37   
Bavaria 0.18 0.39   
Year 2003 0.49 0.50  
Source: SOEP 2001 and 2003. Survey weights are used.  N=14430.   1: year 2001 only.
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Table A.3: Simultaneous equation model:
 Determinants of works councillorship in West Germany (2001) 
Specification 1 (2001)
 Parameter / 
Std.-Err.
Marginal
Effect
Male 0.066 0.044 
 (0.084)  
Foreigner 0.419** -0.040 
 (0.142)  
Part-time employment -0.229* -0.032 
 (0.113)  
Age (in years) 0.113*** 0.014 
 (0.029)  
Age squared (in years) -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.000)  
Tenure (in years) 0.029* 0.008 
 (0.014)  
Tenure squared (in years) -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)  
Apprenticeship 0.360** 0.007 
 (0.110)  
University degree 0.214 -0.054 
 (0.133)  
Prefers Social Democrats (SPD) 0.040 0.093 
 (0.087)  
Prefers Christian Parties (CDU/CSU) -0.115 -0.021 
 (0.101)  
Blue collar worker  0.109 0.129 
 (0.099)  
Father was self-employed 0.176 -0.038 
 (0.113)  
Firm size: 20 ? X < 200 employees 0.896*** 0.008 
(0.130)  
Firm size: 200 ? X < 2000 employees 0.924*** 0.034 
 (0.146)  
Firm size: X ? 2000 employees 0.912*** 0.100 
 (0.141)  
Constant -6.059***  
 (0.687)  
Industry dummies (NACE 1- digit) yes
State dummies yes
Wald-Test_X (degrees of freedom) 1562.14 (80)** 
Wald-Test_ ?  (degrees of freedom) 11.77 (1)** 
Number of Observations 7046 
Source:  GSOEP 2001. Sample weights are used. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 Significance levels: ** (0.01), * (0.05), + (0.1). 
 Wald_Test_X: H0: no joint significance of all regressors. Wald-Test_ ? : H0: ? =0. 
 Estimated parameters of the union membership equation are found in Table 3. 
